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Supplemental Essay: Decadence in Western Culture

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Introduction and history

​In the main essay I said that freedom and anxiety tend to result in decadence as a cultural and aesthetic lifestyle (which subsequently tends to be reflected in Existentialism as a philosophy and Nihilism as politics). So it is useful to start with some history about the beginning of modern western decadence.

 

The genesis of modern decadence

In pre-modern times people lived in communal settings such as tribes or peasant villages. In the Intuition chapter I talked a bit about the dichotomous pairing of collectivism (representing the extraverted side) versus individualism (representing the introverted side). In pre-modern times society was basically synonymous with collectivism. To the degree that each individual might wish to develop individualism as the dichotomous opposite, that was facilitated through initiations at puberty when young teens were taught about hero journeys and encouraged to pick a socially-sanctioned totem or narrative for further personal development. (See the Sensing chapter for more on that.)

 

As I said in the main essay, traditional, pre-modern societies were less free and more rigid than modern times, but the positive side of that rigidity was that society provided guidelines for behavior (in the form of cultural canons, initiation rites, etc.) that kept individuals anchored in the realm of conventional, healthy one-sidedness.

 

Starting in the late 1700s industrialization ended much of the pre-modern collective village lifestyle and drove millions of people into cities to work in factories, where they became anonymous individuals floating around in a highly fragmented state. Industrialization and urban life brought new freedoms; but urban dwellers missed the communal life of the village and they craved a type of "recollectivization." Along with industrialization came modern mass communication: Rising literacy rates, a popular press, radio, and early movies resulted in shared national values. In this manner the masses were able to find a measure of "recollectivization" through the experience of assimilation into mass culture. The formation of modern nation-states gave rise to nationalism, another form of mass collectivism. 

 

However, Europe's artistic communities rebelled against industrialization and the rise of the urban lifestyle. Industrialization sprang from Enlightenment belief in rationality, science, and technology; but Rousseau and the Romantic movement saw industrialization and city life as a dehumanizing influence and fought it. The Romantics increasingly rejected mainstream culture and considered those who supported it (the bourgeois, the middle class) to be "philistines." Instead, the Romantics championed the working poor, the proletariat, the dispossessed, and even the criminal element.

 

In his book The Culture We Deserve, the historian Jacques Barzun says that after the French Revolution "art took over the role that religion had formerly played in holding up to the impure world the divine promise and reproach of a pure one. With the Romanticists, the city of God became the vision of art. It was then also that the bourgeois citizen became an object of hatred and contempt, because he believed in the world--in trade, in politics, in regular hours, a steady life, a safe marriage, sound investments, and a paunchy old age. His moral complacency and artistic philistinism appear the enemy of all generous emotion, the antithesis of everything spiritual and selfless in man."[1]

 

Romantic artists increasingly set themselves apart from mainstream culture. Some used satire, exploration of the underside of life, and abstraction in their art to shock and jar the bourgeois world. Some withdrew from society and established themselves in counterculture Bohemian communities, lived the life of starving artists, and simply turned their backs on the middle-class philistines who didn't understand their art.[2]

 

In turn, mainstream culture and the middle class rejected the Bohemian artist communities with their dissident schools of modernism, Impressionism, and Symbolism. The solid bourgeois mainstream citizen and the Bohemian artist seemed irreconcilable. But the early 1900s and the outbreak of the two world wars changed all that.

 

Under economic and social stress in the lead-up to the two world wars and the Great Depression, mass communication caused populations to coalesce into nation-wide, collectivist political movements: Hence Nazism and Communism arose after World War I, while the allied nations banded together under the banners of democracy and capitalism. However, the two world wars left tremendous devastation in their wake, especially in Europe where the fighting had been worst. After the wars, the middle class ceased to believe that mass political movements and populist governments could save the world; existentialism and nihilism sprung up in the capital cities of Europe.

 

After the two world wars and in the ensuing disillusionment with government mass political movements, the middle class increasingly came to view the dissident artists as prescient in their early opposition to mass culture. The bourgeois middle class increasingly took up the banner of the avant-garde artists and their rebellion against national collectivism, cultural assimilation, and mass culture.

 

Barzun describes this reversal in public esteem for modern art: "The nineteenth century may be said to have ended in 1914, and after the murderous war that began then, Western societies had changed. For one thing, it looked as if the philistine had been killed along with the other millions. For another, the newest art was more than ever a criticism of life and a refuge from its horrors. By 1920 art as such was the concern or pastime of a wider public than ever before, and, no matter how weird its latest forms, was accepted without protest. The past had shown that the public was always wrong, so wisdom and snobbery alike dictated humble submission to whatever came. For these philistines in reverse gear everything in a gallery or a book or on the stage was 'interesting.' It was experimental, and who would dare to challenge an experiment?"[3]

 

This anti-establishment aesthetic was the genesis of widespread decadence in modern western culture. 

 

Decadence

To recap the introduction to decadence that I provided in the main essay:

 

Traditional, pre-modern societies tended to anchor society in the realm of conventional, healthy one-sidedness. Modern freedoms, on the other hand, deprive western society of that anchor and allow people to get pulled into ego expansion or contraction and experience anxiety. The result:

  • People who tend toward ego expansion drift outward in the direction of extreme extraversion (represented by masochism) or extreme introversion (represented by sadism);

  • People who tend toward ego contraction collapse inward toward anomie in the center.

 

Thus in modern times the five-position spectrum looks like this:

Masochism <- Conventional one-sided extraversion -> Anomie <- Conventional one-sided introversion -> Sadism

 

As I said above, decadence is the cultural and aesthetic manifestation of anxiety. So I'll argue the following:

  • In states of ego expansion, masochism and sadism manifest themselves as decadent victimhood and decadent rebellion; and

  • In states of ego contraction, anomie manifests itself as decadent disengagement from society.

 

As a result, the five-position spectrum for decadence becomes:

Decadent victimhood <- Conventional one-sided extraversion -> Decadent disengagement <- Conventional one-sided introversion -> Decadent rebellion

 

So I will divide the following material into two sections (decadent ego expansion and then decadent ego contraction), develop each separately, and then point out their similarities and dissimilarities.

 

Decadent ego expansion: The victim and the rebel

Introduction

Ego expansion represents movement outward on the five-position spectrum, that is, in the direction of extreme one-sidedness. When expressed in terms of the aesthetic of decadence, the extraverted extreme becomes decadent victimhood and the introverted extreme becomes decadent rebellion.

 

Decadent victimhood and decadent rebellion represent extreme one-sidedness, and they have the same problematic nature as any other type of extreme one-sidedness: When people tend toward ego expansion they can expand outward into extreme one-sidedness, where they can get "stuck" in parental castration. In turn, parental castration tends to be accompanied by the daemonic of dichotomous opposite in the form of fears of shadowy "others" who persecute you.

 

As I said above: After the two world wars, people who made up the middle class increasingly lost faith in government and mass political movements; they joined the avant-garde artists in their rejection of collectivism, mass culture, and cultural assimilation. In terms of parental castration and daemonic fears:

  • Frustration at big government and mass culture becomes a cause for parental castration; and 

  • People project their daemonic fears outward into the collective and view other elements of society (specific political actors, the other sex, other races, other classes) as a threat. 

 

This is a perfect model for ego expansion and decadence. As I said above, decadence typically occurs when society seems at an impasse, for example when an idyllic past is seemingly replaced by a grim, dystopian present and future. When elements of the middle class drift into extreme one-sidedness, have no faith in government and mass culture, and are haunted by shadowy "others" bent on their destruction, then:

  • Decadent extraverts focus on victimhood narratives and self-punish; and 

  • Decadent introverts fixate on outrage narratives, rebel, and lash out against others.

 

As I described above, in the early and mid-1800s Romantics channeled this energy into a condemnation of society. They explored rebellion, counter-culture influences, and things that were bizarre, fetishistic, and shocking. To the extent that they created art for society, the aim was to shock and disgust: To confront the bourgeois "philistines" with their own hypocrisies and shortcomings.

 

In other words, the Romantics embraced transgression. In the book Sexual Personae Camille Paglia says, "Decadent art is ritualistic and epiphanic. Its content: Romantic sexual personae, the hierarchs, idolators, and victims of daemonic nature. [...] Decadent art makes hostile claims on the viewer. Its style is pagan spectacle and pagan flaunting."[4]

 

In modern times, with the emphasis on political expression, the rejection of society becomes more demanding and confrontational. Extraverted decadent victims turn into a constant victim class, crying that society preys upon them and persecutes them; introverted decadent rebels turn into a constant accusatory chorus, raging and condemning society.

 

The two sides eventually feed on and amplify each other: The decadent victims point to the rage of the rebels as one more proof of the evilness and unfairness of society; and the decadent rebels point to the victim class and its sufferings as proof of the evils of society. Each side uses the other side as justification for their own side; the two extreme sides become a horseshoe, bending around to meet each other in mutual condemnation of society. 

 

Together the victims and the rebels generate a continuous narrative of the failure of modern society that keeps both sides locked in a state of rage and grievance. There is even a certain amount of crossover between the two: As I've noted in other contexts, all adults have gone through all the developmental stages and as a result have access to the full panoply of psychological functions. Rebels and victims have so much in common in terms of their rejection of modern society that it's easy for the rebel to play the victim and vice versa. In a way, it's another demonstration of the idea that I mentioned in the section entitled "Extreme One-sidedness at the S Level" that sadist and masochist (predator and victim) share a certain "synergy" and use each other to reinforce their own mentality. Except in this instance they are both working toward the same end; their mutual rage and despair is aimed at society at large.

 

Barzun

The historian Jacques Barzun talks at length about the decadent rejection of mainstream society in his book The Culture We Deserve. Like the Romantics rejecting Industrialization in the early 1800s, modern decadents feel cornered and frustrated: "Thrown back wholly on themselves, men feel their insufficiency. They see more and more clearly that they are not in control of their individual lives or collective destiny, and that many of their practical goals elude their reach. Because of increasing populations, because of the momentum of material things, it appears harder and harder to accomplish any purpose, even one that commands general agreement. To get pollution out of the air, to provide housing or realize the theoretical possibilities of communication and transportation become 'problems' whose solutions recede as time flies."[5]

 

Elsewhere Barzun asks: "[H]ow does the historian know when Decadence sets in? By the open confessions of malaise [...T]he old ideals look outworn or hopeless and practical aims are made into creeds sustained by violent acts [...] The upshot is a floating hostility to things as they are. It inspires the repeated use of the dismissive prefixes anti- and post- (anti-art, post-modernism) and the promise to reinvent this or that institution. The hope is that getting rid of what is will by itself generate the new life."[6]

 

Barzun relates it to "the now universal populism" and he calls it "rule by collective resistance and organized menace" and "bargaining by outrage."[7]

 

The youth in particular feel the burden of the times: "Despair, indifference, the obsession with cruelty and death, the Samson complex of wanting to bring down the whole edifice on one's head and the heads of its retarded upholders--those passions seize the souls of the young generations and turn them into violent agents of change, or disabused skeptics and cynics."[8] In turn, they attract the attention of the older intellectuals: "Seeing the poor, the rich, and the middling all contributing their quotas of vandals and dropouts, seeing youth as a new class, commercially important, but in open warfare with the world, the liberal imagination of educators and social philosophers concludes that here is one more witness to the bankruptcy of 'bourgeois values.'"[9]

 

Barzun says that intellectual opinion today "supports local passion against any central authority, and denounces all sanctions. In other words, power has ceased to be legitimate except when the people take it into their hands."[10]

 

Ultimately, the cause of modern decadence is freedom, leisure, and abundance, in fact, the very strength and success of modern western culture. They generate possibilities and opportunities but don't provide answers or guidance, which results in anxiety. Barzun says, "[T]he present spiritual distress and revolutionary surge come at a time of general affluence and high productivity; a time, moreover, when thanks to industry Western civilization has reversed the age-old proportions of rich and poor. It is certainly our shame that fifteen to twenty percent of our most advanced populations are in want, yet it is not by accident that the ratio is no longer what it always used to be--twenty percent in comfort and eighty percent in want. But nothing is harder to bear than the contrast between what is and what might be. The power to create wealth has given mankind a glimpse of universal plenty, and when we find ourselves far from abundance on a global scale, impatience turns into fury."[11]

 

Barzun goes on to say that even if we could achieve "planetary prosperity," it wouldn't matter: "It might make the poor and disfranchised happier, but one may wonder for how long, since those already free from want, tyranny, ignorance, and superstition declare themselves the most oppressed and miserable of men and willingly risk what they have in order to smash the system."[12]

 

In the end, Barzun talks about the future and the way forward for society; I'll discuss that at the end of this supplemental essay. But in the interim, Barzun has a warning for modern decadent victims and rebels based on the fate of similar movements in the past: "Anarchy goes so far; then it generates repression. Such a reversal would bring on a puritanism of the most relentless kind. Artists, free thinkers, and free lovers who currently denounce the Western countries as police states would from their labor camps long for the good old days."[13]

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Decadent ego contraction: The dropout

Introduction

To recap: Traditional, pre-modern societies kept individuals anchored in the realm of conventional, healthy one-sidedness. Modern freedoms, on the other hand, deprive western society of that anchor and allow people to get pulled into ego expansion or contraction and experience anxiety.

 

People who tend toward ego contraction feel anxiety when they engage in ego expansion. So they get in the habit of hunkering down in their comfort zone, adopting a posture of retreat, and playing it safe in life to avoid anxiety, conflict, and disappointment. People who tend toward ego contraction may collapse inward toward the middle of the five-position spectrum and begin to demonstrate anomie: Disconnectedness from society, alienation, apathy, and cynicism.

 

If decadence is the cultural and aesthetic manifestation of anxiety, then anomie turns into decadent disengagement from society. Many of the Romantic artists of the early 1800s demonstrated anomie and decadent disengagement. They rejected industrialization and urbanization and isolated themselves from mainstream society; they became the decadent dropouts of their time.

 

Theme of the androgyne

Alienated from mainstream society, Romantic decadent dropouts embraced the working poor, the proletariat, the dispossessed, and even the criminal element. The androgyne was one of the chief counter-cultural influences that the Romantic artists championed. In her book Sexual Personae Paglia says that by the late 1800s the androgyne was at the center of the decadent visual arts: She says that by 1893 the androgyne "mushrooms over culture like an antichrist." The decadent art of that period is filled with self-contained, indolent, hermaphroditic figures.[14]

 

So the androgyne was a particularly apt symbol for Romantic-era decadent dropouts. As I said in the main essay, androgyny shares a number of features with anomie and decadent disengagement. Both the androgyne and the decadent dropout are "a closed circle, self-contained." The androgyne represents a nullification of sex; similarly, the decadent dropout represents a nullification of one-sidedness. Neither the androgyne nor the decadent dropout identifies with a set of preferred narratives on either side of a dichotomous pair, and as a result they both have no particular personal agenda or agency. So the androgyne and the decadent dropout both tend to float about on the edges of society, take up a posture of self-completeness, and live in a bubble of detachment and passivity.

 

As I said in the Sensing chapter in the section entitled "Sexuality versus Spirituality," androgynes have no need to seek their other half in marriage or in society at large; they are their own "other half." Paglia says, "Egoism is the androgyne's raison d'être. Self-complete beings need no one and nothing."[15] The androgyne ends up living passively, confined to a very narrow range of action. This becomes decadent closure: Living in a self-contained bubble can turn into a prison. In other words, the androgyne frees himself from anxiety, but that freedom comes at the price of passivity, solipsism, and self-imprisonment. The androgyne backs off and observes the world passively and without empathy or connection, awaiting something to come along and stir him or her, be it a great beauty or a great ugliness.

 

This description of the androgyne is a perfect model for ego contraction and decadent disengagement. As I said above, decadence typically occurs when society seems at an impasse, for example when an idyllic past is seemingly replaced by a grim, dystopian present and future. At such times, decadent dropouts contract down to the point of non-participation in life and anomie as an anxiety-stilling exercise. Like the Romantics in the late 1800s, today's decadent dropouts grow disgusted with contemporary society and retreat to solitary and self-pleasuring pursuits. They stand apart in a bubble of detachment and passivity, observing life but refusing to participate in it. Like the androgyne, they observe the world passively and without empathy or connection, waiting for something to come along and stir them.

 

When they are finally stirred by something, it tends to become a fetish for them; it becomes a monomania. Think of the example of dropouts spending their lives in their parents' basements with no concern for the outside world and having only one or two interests in life: Getting high and playing video games day and night.

 

The result is a Decadent "amoral cult of beauty."[16] Prior to modern times, art was expected to be uplifting and have a moral message. But with decadence, attractions are objectified and stripped of any meaning beyond their beauty, which is measured by their ability to engage the attention or interest or obsession of the androgyne. Living in their bubble of detachments, decadents are unconcerned with things that are commonplace; only extremes attract their interest. Paglia notes the themes of High and Late Romanticism: "cruelty, sexual ambiguity, narcissism, fascination, obsession, vampirism, seduction, violation..."[17]

 

Feminine and masculine elements

I said above that androgynes and decadent dropouts represent the nullification of one-sidedness and sex. However, it is more accurate to say that decadent androgynes have characteristics of both sexes: The characteristics don't necessarily cancel each other out; often they continue to express themselves in distorted form. There is a conscious element representing a focus on either the feminine/sexual or the masculine/spiritual influence, and then a separate unconscious element representing the repressed form of the dichotomous opposite.

 

How do these two elements express themselves in the decadent "amoral cult of beauty"?

 

The decadent feminine component

Normally, under conditions of healthy, conventional one-sidedness, the feminine or matriarchal influence is associated with extraversion, immersion in the collective, compliance, and care for others; it is also associated with nature, disorder, chaos, emotion, sexuality, and earth. In Sexual Personae, Camille Paglia calls it the Dionysian influence. (Dionysus was the dress-wearing Greek god of drink, ecstasy, fertility, madness, etc. who presided over the women's Eleusinian rites).

 

But in the realm of decadent contraction, the feminine influence is represented somewhat differently. I've said in the past that extraverts tend to have a focus on the maternal influence. Decadent extraverted dropouts are often fascinated by women, but at the same time their androgyne self-completeness makes them wary of women's attractions; they don't want to be drawn against out of their bubble of detachment into the world of attachments, love, and anxiety. So they tend to have a bit of a love-hate relationship with the opposite sex; they are "both fascinated and repelled by the mystery of sex."[18]

 

One way for the decadent extraverted dropout to indulge his sexual fantasies and still retain his androgyne distance and composure is to take an interest in cruel, powerful mother figures, who may be represented in decadent culture and art as vampires and femmes fatales. Strong, masculine, vampiric women are attractive in that they offset the dropout's own passivity; and at the same time the dropout's anxiety arising from exposure to the sexual aspect is stilled by making the woman inaccessible or unapproachable. Often the women are portrayed as highly sexual, but the sexual urge itself is blocked or diverted by representing women as cruel and punishing.

 

An example: Alfred Hitchcock was a filmmaker who directed thrillers and suspense films in the mid-1900s. In her book Provocations, Camille Paglia says, "There is abundant evidence of Hitchcock's insistence on total and sometimes autocratic control of his productions as well as of his leading ladies." Hitchcock was known for supervising every aspect of the costuming of his leading ladies, from fabric choice to style and color, accompanying them to fittings and choosing their make-up and jewelry. Paglia says,  "Hitchcock warned Janet Leigh before Psycho, 'My camera is absolute.' His camera habitually frames woman as a gorgeous cult object whom he loves to dress and drape." But then Paglia goes on to explain: "Simultaneously in Hitchcock, there is a dread of the imperialistic power of mothers, who are often belittling, hectoring, or suffocating. The ultimate symbol of this is the mummified mother's laughing skull in Psycho: horrific Mrs. Bates, with her flapping jaw, is the flip side of Rear Window's chic Lisa Fremont, 'who never wears the same dress twice.' [...] The frightful shower murder is like a ceremonial purification and slaughter, a blood sacrifice to a jealous local goddess who will brook no rivals. Mrs. Bates vampirically lives through her psychotic son, her skeletal face being briefly superimposed over his at the end, as we hear her crotchety voice usurping his inner thoughts." Paglia goes on to list the various femmes fatales in Hitchcock's films.

 

This sounds very much like the love-hate attitude of a decadent androgyne toward women. Hitchcock presents women as beautiful and powerful, but also terrifying or threatening. Paglia says, "Hitchcock's great films of the 1950s and early '60s show the tension between men's fear of emotional dependency and their worship of women's beauty, which floods the eye and enforces an erotic response over which a man has ethical but not conceptual control. [...] The two poles of Hitchcock's erotic vision are woman as objet d'art and woman as devouring mother. One pleasures the eye, and the other assaults it."[19]

 

Paglia devotes an entire chapter of her book Sexual Personae to depictions of women in decadent art. She says,"Decadent art's main mission is to record the modes of female power. Its theme is hierarchic assertion, pure charismatic presence."[20] For example, she says that the decadent artist Edward Burne-Jones painted a single female model repeatedly in his paintings, putting her face on both male and female characters. Paglia says, "Burne-Jones' transexual world is populated by one incestuously self-propagating being. We are in another Late Romantic bower, shadowless under a grey sky. The ritual limitation on his sexual personae is a Decadent closure, denying our eye right of access to other human types." In one painting called The Golden Stairs Burne-Jones depicts 18 women, all with the same face. Paglia says, "We drown in a shower of identical women, eighteen in all, cloning themselves and assaulting the eye. Beauty in excess makes Decadent dyspepsia."[21] (For more on this subject, see my notes on Chapter 19 of Sexual Personae: https://www.functionlevels.com/chapter-19-notes)

 

The result is decadent fetishism and self-enslavement in the orbit of the vampire. Paglia refers to this as "embowerment" or being trapped in a "bower." The reference is to Spenser's The Fairie Queene, where knights are diverted from their quests and trapped by witches or vampires in a "bower of bliss": It's the castrating vagina that steals the knight's energy and traps him in domestic servitude.[22]

 

The decadent masculine component

Normally, under conditions of healthy, conventional one-sidedness, the masculine or patriarchal influence is associated with introversion, consciousness, differentiation, and individualism; it is also associated with order, hierarchy, the building of civilization, culture, rationality, spirituality, and sky. Camille Paglia calls it the Apollonian influence (Apollo was one of the most "spiritual" of the Greek gods, being the god of oracles, prophecy, healing, archery, music and arts, light, knowledge, etc.)

 

But in the realm of decadent contraction, the masculine influence is represented somewhat differently. I've said in the past that introverts tend to have a focus on the paternal influence. Decadent introverted dropouts are often fascinated by focus, differentiation, hierarchy, etc., but at the same time their androgyne self-completeness makes them wary of interacting with the world around them. In other words, these traditionally patriarchal interests aren't utilized by decadent androgynes or dropouts for "civilization-building" purposes but rather serve as an aesthetic with which to perceive the world around them.

 

To spell it out a bit more: In healthy introverted one-sidedness, positive concepts like closure, boundaries, and hierarchy are related to differentiation and analysis: Things are picked apart, isolated, and studied as part of science and the building of civilization. But in decadent form those same concepts turns into passivity, asexuality, and voyeurism. The decadent "amoral cult of beauty" appears as an exaggerated aestheticism. From inside his bubble of self-imprisonment, the decadent androgyne observes, analyzes, and dissects the nature of beauty and ugliness; he becomes an aesthete and perhaps even a dandy--a connoisseur of sophistication and beauty--but otherwise remains a non-actor in life.

 

Thus the "civilization-building" component of the masculine influence is abandoned, and the masculine influence is diverted into aggressive aestheticism. Decadent aesthetic focus and attention bring clarity by distinguishing and separating details out from their surroundings and hardening their boundaries as objects of decadent fetishism. Decadent art is often ornate, rich, and polished like a fine jewel. In reference to the paintings of the Pre-Raphaelite Brotherhood, Paglia says, "Pre-Raphaelite art, like Mannerism, disturbingly avoids pictorial focus. Our eye is not automatically guided to the human figures but is forced to wander over the microscopic detail. Color is unshaded and applied in separate cells, as in Byzantine mosaic or Gautier's gorgeous color units. Flowers and blades of grass are brilliantly lapidary, the paint surface so richly worked that there is only a single step from Pre-Raphaelite naturism to Gustave Moreau's Decadent jewelled artifice. Everything in Pre-Raphaelite painting is seen too clearly. The eye is invited but coerced. Part triumphs over whole, exerting an uncomfortable pressure on the viewer."[23]

 

The decadent aesthete prizes hardness, artificiality, superficial beauty. The aesthete increasingly becomes an elitist and sensualist, obsessed with finding and isolating for his own enjoyment things that are beautiful, extreme, or outrageous. Anything else is simply beneath his notice. Isolated in this manner, attractions are objectified and stripped of any meaning beyond their great beauty, which is measured by their ability to engage the attention or interest or obsession of the aesthete. Paglia notes that this emphasis on beauty alone displaces and shoulders out any other way of regarding things and people, such as meaning or morality or depth: Paglia says, "The aesthete is an immoralist."[24]

 

Decadent aestheticism also applies to social relations. Paglia devotes two chapters of Sexual Personae to Oscar Wilde's novel The Picture of Dorian Gray and his play The Importance of Being Earnest. Paglia considers Wilde to be one of literature's most famous examples of the Decadent aesthete. 

 

The emphasis in decadent art is on beauty; in decadent literature, on the other hand, the emphasis is on form and ritual. Paglia says, "Wilde's play is governed by the formalities of social life, which emerge with dancelike ritualism. The key phrase of the English fin de siecle was Lionel Johnson's maxim, 'Life must be a ritual.' In Dorian Gray, Wilde says, 'The canons of good society are, or should be, the same as the canons of art. Form is absolutely essential to it. It should have the dignity of a ceremony, as well as its unreality.'"[25]

 

In the decadent "amoral cult of beauty," the only thing that matters is appearance. The passive androgyne simply watches life from his bubble of detachment, so the premium is on how one looks to an admiring audience. Paglia says, "Matters of form are uppermost, in life and death. Emotion is nothing, the public impression everything. [...] Every event occurs with naked visibility on a vast, flat plain. Life is a play scrutinized by a ring of eyes. Dorian Gray contains a major Wildean principle: 'To become the spectator of one's own life is to escape the suffering of life.'"[26] In other words, when you master public form and ritual you make yourself impervious to censure by others and thus avoid anxiety that causes ego contraction.

 

A corollary of form and ritual is hierarchy. Paglia says that hierarchy is "the secret subject of Dorian Gray."[27] Everything in the novel becomes about pecking order, rank, class, and so on. Paglia says, "Beauty, appealing to the pagan eye, is Apollonian hierarchy, Greek divinity. Dorian Gray makes complicated use of the western idea of hierarchies. Beautiful persons are aristoi, 'the best.' They are Dostoyevsky’s 'extraordinary men,' who have the Sadean 'right to commit any crime.' The ugly belong to a lower order of being."[28] Paglia suggests that this sense of beauty as a marker of hierarchy probably relates to the charisma of narcissistic people or the glamor of celebrities.[29]

 

Paglia also relates this to Wilde's witticisms. Paglia says that witticisms are used to assert caste relations in a hierarchy: "The persona latent in the Wildean witticism is a hierarch, the androgyne as social despot. [...] Rhetorical energy is devoted to social differentiation and segregation."[30] The characters in The Importance of Being Earnest trade barbs as a form of social combat, and it's all for appearances: "[O]rder is admired not because it is right or just but because it is beautiful. In fact, order here makes no intellectual sense at all. [...] Aristocracy in Earnest satisfies aesthetic and not moral demands."[31]

 

Paglia notes that Wilde's witticisms are alive and well today in the gay subculture: "From Wilde's life and work came the aesthetic of high camp, an Apollonian mode of comedy and connoisseurship." She notes that even today the gay world "follows a vanished aristocratic code: class consciousness, racial stratification, amoral veneration of youth, beauty, and glamour, love of scandal and gossip, and use of the stinging bon mot and theatrical persona of the androgyne of manners. Thus Wilde's English epicene has secretly transmitted British hierarchism to other lands and other times."[32] (For more on decadence in Oscar Wilde, see my notes on Chapter 20 of Sexual Personae: https://www.functionlevels.com/chapter-20-notes)

 

Summing up the feminine and masculine influences together in decadent ego contraction

The decadent androgyne is keenly aware of beauty; but feminine sexuality, changeability, Dionysianism, and chaos (which Paglia condenses under the umbrella term of "liquidity") are dangerous to the decadent dropout--they threaten his bubble of detachment. So the feminine component is made hard and unapproachable by isolating it and turning it into an objet d'art, a fetish. Paglia says "All art, as a cult of the autonomous object, is a flight from liquidity. The Decadent swerve from sexual experience is identical with the Decadent creation of a world of glittering art objects. Both are responses to the horror of the female liquid realm."[33]

 

Paglia says, "Art supplants nature. The object d'art becomes the center of fetishistic connoisseurship. Person is transformed into beautiful thing, beyond the law. Decadence takes western sexual personae to their ultimate point of hardness and artificiality. It is drenched in sex, but sex as thought rather than action. Decadence is an Apollonian raid on the Dionysian, the aggressive eye pinning and freezing nature's roiling objects."[34]

 

As a result, the art and culture of the decadent androgyne taunts and teases, it shocks and disgusts, and it is sexual but also serves to block any kind of emotion or connection as dangerous to the principle of decadent detachment. This is the point where art and culture of the decadent androgyne differs from the art and culture of decadent sadomasochism: The decadent victim and rebel attach themselves too much to a cause or outlook, whereas the decadent dropout detaches himself from everything and keeps the world at a safe distance. Or to put it another way:

  • Decadent ego expansion and sadomasochism are the result of parental castration, which gives rise to the daemonic of the dichotomous opposite in the form of fears projected out into society;

  • Decadent ego contraction and anomie consist of an aesthetic of deliberate passive observation that is supported by a repressed version of the dichotomous opposite.

 

However, as I suggested in the supplemental essay on anomie, decadent detachment with its lack of healthy narratives and one-sidedness leaves dropouts prone to sudden bursts of ego expansion and sadomasochism, usually to their own dismay and detriment. This is exactly the kind of involvement in the world and anxiety-ridden adventure that they are trying to avoid by dropping out. But with no narratives and no personal agenda or agency to serve as guide or guardrails in their life, they can get ambushed by their own repressed needs. A random masochistic victim narrative or sadistic outrage narrative seizes their attention and draws them into drama and conflict despite their own attempts to stay disengaged. To regain their decadent disengagement, they may need to destroy the thing they love; or the alternative is that they themselves are destroyed by the resulting conflict.

 

This is probably the mechanism behind a lot of anti-hero plots in modern movies. An ordinary person is minding his own business, but he gets pulled into drama and confrontation by some force outside his own will: A great love, a great rivalry, sympathy for an underdog, or perhaps just some absurdity of modern life. But the confrontation quickly spirals out of control and leads to tragedy and martyrdom. 

 

The message of such movies is that the world is a dangerous place, and one wrong step can precipitate a catastrophe. And sometimes life genuinely seems like that: We all claim to want peace and communication; but one look at social media on the internet shows that conflict is always just a wrong word or a misinterpretation away. (Or at least, that's the way that decadent dropouts see the world.)

​

Decadence in society today

Introduction

To recap: As I said above, Paglia, Barzun, and other commentators suggest that western culture is currently stuck in a long-term trend of social and cultural decadence. Decadence aligns with a sense that society seems at an impasse, for example when an idyllic past is seemingly replaced by a grim, dystopian present and future. 

 

A lot of that feeling of impasse is the result of anxiety generated by the freedoms enjoyed by western culture. Modern freedoms remove cultural guardrails and lead to anxiety. Anxiety, in turn, can express itself in two opposing trends: Ego expansion into sadomasochism or ego contraction into anomie. Decadence is the cultural expression of that process, resulting in two basic trends:

  • Ego expansion results in decadent victims and rebels who clamor and complain of the unfairness of life; 

  • Ego contraction results in decadent dropouts who disengage and retreat into an attitude of non-participation in life in order to still their anxiety.

 

In other words, the five-position spectrum for modern anxiety starts with this:

Masochism <- Conventional one-sided extraversion -> Anomie <- Conventional one-sided introversion -> Sadism

 

and changes to this:

Decadent victimhood <- Conventional one-sided extraversion -> Decadent disengagement <- Conventional one-sided introversion -> Decadent rebellion

 

These trends certainly seem to exist in contemporary western culture; so where do we go from here? Is western culture in an irreversible slide into fragmentation and social collapse, or can we bounce back from the modern attitude of cynicism and nihilism?

 

Types of decadence

According to Jacques Barzun, history demonstrates that there are both small decadences and big decadences. In small decadences, culture grinds to a halt temporarily while cynics and agents of change reject the old ways and clear the ground for new ideals and new growth. In big decadences, on the other hand, Barzun says that "not enough new ideas, no vitalizing hopes, emerge, and civilization falls apart in growing disorder, mounting frustration, and brainless destruction."[35]

 

Writing in 1989, Barzun says that people today are disillusioned with many of the cultural institutions that make up modern civilization--government, religion, morality, social intercourse, language, the arts, and public hope. He says, "There is no doubt that regarding the outer shell or container of civilization, which is the state, all our efforts tend against aggregation and toward disintegration." So the question then becomes "whether the events we are witnessing are preparing another open and level ground for a reawakened animal faith and the creation of undreamed-of new things, or whether on the contrary our sullen doings have reached repetition in futility."[36] Barzun inventories the state of western culture's main institutions and finds them either in a state of retreat or actively working to tear down the icons and ideas of previous times.[37]

 

Collectivism vs individualism

Looking at the question through the lens of the collectivism-versus-individualism dichotomy that I discussed at the start of this supplemental essay: If western society is tending toward "disintegration," then it could probably benefit from a bit more collectivism with the aim of building more consensus around some core social values; the result would be a degree of "recollectivization" of an increasingly fragmented culture. On the other hand we also obviously value our freedoms, independence, and individuality, and we wouldn't want to lose those things entirely in the process of building social consensus. So the key would be to avoid extremes and try to find some kind of middle path.

 

Taking the two sides separately:

 

Collectivism

Collectivism can be a good thing. As I mentioned at the start of this supplemental essay, traditionally humanity lived in collective tribal and village settings. In modern times government tends to play a collectivist role, using the tools of mass communication.

 

But the experience of the world wars shows that too much assimilation and collectivization can lead to mass movements and a compliant population, which can then become a dangerous tool in the hands of demagogues. It can lead to a state of affairs where millions lay down their lives for a political cause or national flag without questioning what their sacrifice is gaining them.

 

Even in the present there are times when the government and its proxies try to use the tools of mass communication and marketing to push a centralized message or value that they think would benefit the population and lead to a greater degree of social cohesion. But excessive centralization and oversight can lead to excesses or abuses, resulting in renewed public cynicism and loss of trust.

 

Abuses occur when government engages in social engineering by micromanaging the media, corporate, and academic sectors, which are happy to curry government support and funding by providing justification and enforcement for the government's values. The media, corporate, and academic sectors turn into gatekeepers for government social policy and become clogged with administrators monitoring speech and interactions between workers or between students as well as up and down hierarchies, etc. At that point it all starts turning into a zero-sum game: As one government-backed value becomes ubiquitous, competing ideas and narratives are swept aside or even declared illegal.

 

For example, modern western feminism began with the Suffragettes who lobbied for equal constitutional and legal rights around 1905-1928. Subsequent "waves" of feminism over the last 50 years have worked on dismantling various social structures and attitudes that supported patriarchal attitudes and privileged men over women. 

 

However, as I described in the "Sexuality versus Spirituality" section, this process has gone so far that some analysts say that the younger generations of boys and men are underperforming relative to girls and women. (See the book Of Boys and Men: Why the Modern Male Is Struggling by Richard Reeves, published 2022.) The problem is that femininity and masculinity are dichotomous opposites; when government is enlisted to back one side or the other, then it can turn into a zero-sum game. Boosting the role of women in society can turn into a process of undermining the social and support structures for men in society. 

 

To sum up: Government works in favor of healthy collectivism, and it's reasonable for government to step in and address inequities that arise in societies. But government isn't a surgical scalpel; it's more of a blunt instrument. As I said above, excessive centralization and oversight can lead to excesses or abuses, resulting in renewed public cynicism and loss of trust. When government puts its thumb on the scale in favor of one group, the result can be devastating for other groups. As I'll argue below, government should aim for a healthy balance of groups with diverse and conflicting views, as opposed to choosing winners and losers and playing zero-sum games.

 

Individualism

Freedoms, independence, and individuality are clearly good things; they are the battle cry that western culture has rallied around since the world wars. However, taken to the extreme they can lead to anarchy. I have said repeatedly in this blog that freedom can result in anxiety and unhappiness. In the chase for individuality and personal values and meaning, social groups can fragment and individuals can lose their connection to the larger mass of humanity.

 

For example, the hippie culture of the 1960s in the US arose out of post-war prosperity, which led to a burst of social experimentation. At first there were communities and movements to explore alternative lifestyles such as communes (for example, the "back-to-the-land" movement), counterculture communities (for example, Haight-Ashbury), academic groups to explore psychedelics (Timothy Leary's Harvard Project), social groups (Ken Kesey's Merry Pranksters), cultural events (Woodstock), etc. But freedom has no natural endpoint; in a matriarchal environment of freedom, change, and chaos, the patriarchal influences of order and structure appear as daemonic. When larger communities attempted to set rules for communal living, they fragmented over rules and regulations and subdivided into ever smaller sub-cultures; the sub-cultures then spun out of control and dissipated in turn. The result was atomization, burnout, and a slide into hedonism and mass consumption of drugs for pure recreation and escapism. The results ranged from murder at the Altamont Free Concert in 1969 to tens of millions of deaths from the HIV/AIDS crisis of the 1980s and beyond.[38]

 

In her book Sex, Art, and American Culture Camille Paglia sums it up as follows: "The Sixties attempted a return to nature that ended in disaster. The gentle nude bathing and playful sliding in the mud at Woodstock were a short-lived Rousseauist dream. My generation, inspired by the Dionysian titanism of rock, attempted something more radical than anything since the French Revolution. We asked: why should I obey this law? and why shouldn't I act on every sexual impulse? The result was a descent into barbarism. We painfully discovered that a just society cannot, in fact, function if everyone does his own thing."[39]

 

When taken too far, freedom, independence, and individuality can have disastrous consequences for society.

​

Chasing identity

Perhaps the worst of all possible worlds occurs when the government--normally a force for collectivism--sets itself the task of championing freedom, independence, and individuality. The result can be a society that quickly fragments and implodes.

 

The end of the Cold War and a new wave of prosperity in the 1980s led to renewed social experimentation in the 1990s and beyond. The advent of the internet allowed people from all over the world to congregate on-line based on shared interests; but this also allowed for groups to "silo" themselves into autonomous islands based on those interests. And much like the hippies of the 1960s, the "siloed" groups fragmented and reformed based on increasingly esoteric interests.

 

For example, gay rights rightfully found a new level of acceptance and support in the 1990s after the HIV/AIDS epidemic of the 1980s ebbed. But with the advent of the internet, the acceptance of gay rights resulted in new attitudes toward sexual freedom and led to the creation of a myriad of different genders, sexual orientations, sexual identities, fetishes, etc.

 

Academia supported these developments by developing DEI programs (Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion programs) based on affirmative action, intersectionality theories, gender and sexual orientation theories, etc. Intersectionality theories and DEI programs claimed to provide a scientific foundation for additional "siloing" of US society into identity groups based on perceived privilege versus victimization. 

 

Due to the close ties between government and academia and the perception of scientific validity, government increasingly embraced DEI programs and drew media and corporate America into the fold as well. Government acknowledged and recognized the claims of ever-smaller groups of aggrieved identities, promulgated rules on how to address those groups, hire them, provide services for them, etc. 

 

But as frequently happens, the process started turning into a zero-sum game: Competing ideas and narratives were swept aside or even banned. Traditional narratives about larger commonalities that previously united the country were increasingly suppressed. Religion, morals, science, etc. were only deemed valid insofar as they supported the narratives of small identity groups. Experts hunkered down and only pronounced within small niches, afraid of tackling larger issues that might result in conflict with the orthodoxy of the moment or step on the toes of an identity group.

 

Camille Paglia was a college professor and saw how this process corrupted academia. In her book Provocations she says, “Universities are always talking about diversity, by which they mean more women, more blacks, more Hispanics--but they never mean intellectual diversity. [...] It is our responsibility as teachers to articulate the other side--there should never be a party line in a classroom. Too few teachers these days try to ensure that the classroom is a neutral arena of discourse. In fact, many professors claim that it's their obligation to change the world. They'll say things like, 'Yes, I'm trying to change minds,' or 'The purpose of the university is to effect change in society.' Humanities professors all over the country have been saying that openly for at least 25 years. Well, I don't agree with that at all. A professor is there to help students use the mind in a detached, objective way to analyze society and culture. The moment you attempt to convert, you've sold out and become a missionary or ideologue.”[40]

 

The result is elitism and dependence on authority. Paglia herself is a 1960s-vintage anti-establishment left-winger; she asks, "Why has the Democratic party become so arrogantly detached from ordinary Americans? Though they claim to speak for the poor and dispossessed, Democrats have increasingly become the party of an upper-middle-class professional elite, top-heavy with journalists, academics, and lawyers (one reason for the hypocritical absence of tort reform in the healthcare bills)... Affluent middle-class Democrats now seem to be complacently servile toward authority and automatically believe everything party leaders tell them. Why? Is it because the new professional class is a glossy product of generically institutionalized learning? Independent thought and logical analysis of argument are no longer taught. Elite education in the U.S. has become a frenetic assembly line of competitive college application to schools where ideological brainwashing is so pandemic that it's invisible. The top schools, from the Ivy League on down, promote 'critical thinking,' which sounds good but is in fact just a style of rote regurgitation of hackneyed approved terms (‘racism, sexism, homophobia') when confronted with any social issue. The Democratic brain has been marinating so long in those clichés that it's positively pickled."[41]

​

Academia and government aren't wrong to protect the rights of small vulnerable groups. However, the new progressive frameworks are problematic. Modern social issues and the "soft sciences" aren't amenable to prognostication and exploitation in the same manner as the "hard sciences." Intersectionality, gender theory, DEI, etc. reek of "scientism" in that they provide overly simplistic scientific interpretations of complex social problems. Historian Jacques Barzun warns against using scientism to turn everything into overly simplified mechanistic, clockwork systems. He says, "Scientism is the fallacy of believing that the method of science must be used on all forms of experience and, given time, will settle every issue." Barzun cites the example of Karl Marx, who tried to turn politics into a science: "Infatuated with the kudos of science, he persuaded himself and his millions of followers in and out of the Soviet Union that he had at last formulated the mechanics of history and could predict the future scientifically."[42]

 

The eradication of traditional narratives and social support structures and their replacement with the questionable "scientism" of intersectionality, gender theory, DEI, and so on increasingly left many people rudderless and unsure where they fit in. To the extent that whole communities didn't fit neatly into the intersectionality and DEI frameworks or were in fact penalized by them, society started generating increasing numbers of decadent rebels, victims, and dropouts. 

​

In her book Provocations Camille Paglia sums it up as follows:  "Sixties leftism, despite its claims of inclusiveness, disintegrated into the separatism of identity politics, with ghettoizing reclassifications and hypersensitive divisions by race, gender, and sexual orientation. The Sixties code of 'do your own thing' encouraged individualism but produced fragmentation."[43]

 

It continues into the present: No longer able to identify with or enunciate any narratives that they might have in common with others, the younger generations today often speak of evaluating the "authenticity" of public figures as their guide. They make "authenticity" sound like some kind of north star guiding them through life, but it often amounts to little more than gut instinct and personal sympathy. For many, "authenticity" means playing the victim and expressing outrage. 

 

As a result, young people spill out across the internet and latch on to random influencers and podcasters who seem sympathetic. It's not a very sound foundation for society; it leaves the younger generations at the mercy of ideologues, frauds, manipulators, and demagogues, who know how to appeal to the desire for "authenticity" and sympathies of gullible young people. Some of the biggest podcasters and influencers on the internet in terms of audience size are conspiracy theorists: They claim to seek the answers to all of life's mysteries and problems, but in reality they are just feeding on their audience's fear, bigotry, and outrage. As the old joke goes: "Sincerity is everything. If you can fake that, you've got it made."

 

Remedies for decadence

Jacques Barzun: Decadence in bureaucracy and administration

I said that decadence aligns with a sense that society seems at an impasse. In The Culture We Deserve historian Jacques Barzun looks at the problem in terms of western culture and its institutions: They are stuck in place and ineffectual. He says, "What is dying out is the individualism and high art of the Renaissance, the fervor of the Reformation, the hopes of liberalism, the zest of the free and patriotic nation-state." By way of a remedy he suggests, "What is wanted is an open conspiracy of genuine Young Turks who will turn their backs on analysis and criticism and reinvent--say--the idea of the university, and show what it can do; who, seeing that bureaucracy is inevitable, will rethink the art of administration and make it work. And when the energies of reconstruction revivify the landscape, the fine arts will spontaneously mirror the change, show a new face, and the public, enheartened, will rejoice in the new life."[44]

 

New technologies are constantly coming on-line; the world is already very different from when Barzun wrote The Culture We Deserve in 1989. The internet, artificial intelligence, advances in space exploration, etc. are revolutionizing existing institutions and opening new frontiers for development. So perhaps Barzun's ideas will be facilitated by technological advances.

​

Camille Paglia: Decadence in modern academia

Camille Paglia was a college professor, and she has written quite a bit about the causes and effects of decadence in modern academia. Across the years she has highlighted a number of problems with academia ranging from adoption of French post-structuralism and the careerism and bureaucracy of academics to the sheltered attitudes of modern students who demand that college administrators protect them from any idea or action by others that might make them uncomfortable. The following are a couple ideas taken from her book Provocations that focus on education and the courses of study offered at colleges and universities. She mentions three problems in particular:

 

1) Abandonment of historical surveys and classics courses: Back in the 1960s and 1970s students complained about coursework that focused on the history of western culture and the writings of "dead white males"; they said it had no relevance to modern times. In the name of relevance and "presentism," those courses were largely discarded and the result was "a relaxing of academic methods and demands and a proliferation of courses oriented toward the present. Popular culture has entered the classroom as teaching tool as well as subject."[45] On the downside, it also meant that students began graduating without any awareness of the history and formative ideas behind western culture.

 

2) Multiculturalism & siloing of departments: In the 1950s and 1960s, the civil rights movement and labor activism for migrant workers prompted colleges to adopt multiculturalism as a way to explore other cultures. But that meant separating out the cultures and creating separate departments for each, which encouraged "siloing" of the fields: "[N]ew highly politicized departments and programs were created virtually overnight--without the incremental construction of foundation and superstructure that had gone, for example, into the long development of the modern English department. The end result was a further balkanization in university structure, with each area governed as an autonomous fiefdom and with its ideological discourse frozen at the moment of that unit's creation."[46]

 

The new departments brought with them a leftist frame of reference, given their origin in the civil rights and labor movements. Paglia says, "Administrators wanted these programs and fast--to demonstrate the institution's 'relevance' and to head off outside criticism or protest that could hamper college applications and the influx of desirable tuition dollars. Basically, administrators threw money at these programs and let them find their own way. [...] I maintain, from my dismayed observation at the time, that these new add-on programs were rarely if ever founded on authentic scholarly principles; they were public relations gestures meant to stifle criticism of a bigoted past."[47]

 

The "siloing" of academic departments resulted in the graduation of students with niche specialties and no consciousness of the larger flow of history and culture: "Today's campus political correctness can ultimately be traced to the way those new programs, including African-American and Native American studies, were so hastily constructed in the 1970s, a process that not only compromised professional training in those fields over time but also isolated them in their own worlds and thus ultimately lessened their wider cultural impact. [...] The ideology of those new programs and departments, predicated on victimology, has scarcely budged since the 1970s. This is a classic case of the deadening institutionalization and fossilization of once genuinely revolutionary ideas."[48]

 

3) Popular culture: As I said above, the abandonment of historical surveys and classics courses was accompanied by the introduction of popular culture into the classroom. Paglia says that popular culture, TV, and the internet have won. But they only provide staccato images with quick editing and jumps between images and subjects. There is no continuity or context, no history, no larger understanding of art. It's just passive observation of material to shock or titillate. "Young people today are flooded with disconnected images but lack a sympathetic instrument to analyze them as well as a historical frame of reference in which to situate them. [...] The new generation, raised on TV and the personal computer but deprived of a solid primary education, has become unmoored from the mother ship of culture."[49] Paglia says that students increasingly "cannot sense context and thus become passive to the world, which they do not see as an arena for action."[50]

 

To sum up: All of these issues--abandonment of history courses, siloing of academic disciplines, passive consumption of culture--lead to decadent withdrawal into a bubble of passive perception. When people have no context or history with which to understand the world around them, they disengage and become passive consumers. As Paglia said, they don't see the world as "an arena for action." But that leads to the problems I mentioned earlier: Sadomasochism and rebellion, or anomie and disengagement. Paglia says, "America is presently suffering from an effete, cynical pseudointellectuality in the universities, a manic rotation of superficial news cycles in the media, and a generalized hypochondria in the professional middle class, as shown by its preoccupation with stress-related ailments and disorders, buffered by tranquilizers. From a distance, this affluent society, with its avalanche of high-tech toys, must look as if it can barely survive the anxieties of freedom."[51]

 

Paglia suggests remedies for these problems. Paglia says that colleges should recreate a framework of context and history for our culture by embracing multidisciplinary studies: The aim is to foster engagement, agency, and ownership of the culture in graduating students. Thus:

 

1) Multidisciplinary studies to remedy siloing and lack of context: Paglia says, "[E]ducators must first turn away from the sprawling cafeteria menu of over-specialized electives and return to broad survey courses based in world history and culture, proceeding chronologically from antiquity to modernism. Students desperately need a historical framework to understand both past and present."[52]

 

2) Teach archaeology to make multiculturalism more multidisciplinary: Concerning multiculturalism, Paglia says that the desire to learn about other cultures is praiseworthy, but the subject should be taught in a multidisciplinary fashion, not in siloed college departments. For example, she says that multiculturalism can be taught in the context of archeology, which is used to explore the historical roots of culture. "First, archaeology gives perspective, a vivid sense of the sweep of history--too often lacking in today's dumbed-down curriculum. Second, archaeology shows the fragility of culture. It illustrates how even the most powerful of nations succumbed to chaos and catastrophe or to the slow obliteration of nature and time. [...] Third, archaeology introduces the young to the scientific method, presented in the guise of a mystery story. Greek philosophy and logic, revived at the Renaissance and refined in the seventeenth century, produced the archaeological technique of controlled excavation, measurement, documentation, identification, and categorization. Modern archaeology is one of the finest fruits of the Western Enlightenment."[53]

 

3) Teach iconography to make popular culture more multidisciplinary: Popular culture has its positive features. Paglia says, "Creative energy is flowing instead into animation, video games, and cyber-tech, where the young are pioneers. [...] Caricature is our ruling mode."[54] So the goal should be to give popular culture more context and encourage engagement instead of passive consumption. Paglia calls for popular culture to be taught in the form of "iconography"--images taught in the context of art history. Paglia says, "Education must strengthen and discipline the process of visual attention. Today's young have a modest, flexible, chameleonlike ability to handle or deflect the overwhelming pressure of sensory stimuli, but perhaps at a cost to their sense of personal identity. [...] Iconography requires the observational skills and fine attention to detail of literary New Criticism but sets the work into a larger social context [...] The point is not just to show pictures but to seek a commentary that honors both aesthetics and history."[55]

 

To sum up: A multidisciplinary approach recreates a framework of context and history for western culture with the aim of fostering engagement, agency, and ownership of the culture.

​

Religion

Paglia takes much the same approach with regard to religion. An atheist herself, she nonetheless feels that an understanding of religion is required in order to appreciate western culture and arts. She says that each world religion, including Judeo-Christianity and Islam, is "a complex symbol system, a metaphysical lens through which we can see the vastness and sublimity of the universe."[56]

 

She expands on that thought as follows: "All art began as religion, an enterprise born in fear to map and propitiate the mysterious powers of the universe. Religions are complex symbol-systems that use ancient techniques of the oral tradition, such as paradox and metaphor, to convey basic truths about human existence. Today's shallow literary theorists, mired in their own subjectivity, deny there are any universals, but all human beings must confront eternal forces of time, fate, and mortality, which have always been the preoccupation of great art. The sayings of Buddha and the parables of Jesus have universal resonance and should be regarded as foundational to world literature."[57]

 

But Paglia feels that religion has become politicized to the point that there's no longer any common understanding of the subject. She says, "Knowledge of the Bible, one of the West's foundational texts, is dangerously wanting among aspiring young artists and writers. When a society becomes all-consumed in the provincial minutiae of partisan politics (as has happened in the U.S. over the past twenty years), all perspective is lost. Great art can be made out of love for religion as well as rebellion against it. But a totally secularized society with contempt for religion sinks into materialism and self-absorption and gradually goes slack, without leaving an artistic legacy."[58]

 

Paglia points out that religion has largely been banished from the art world: "With the triumph of avant-garde modernism by the mid-twentieth century, few ambitious young artists would dare to show religious work. Though museum collections are rich with religious masterpieces from the Middle Ages through the nineteenth century, major American museums and urban art galleries ignore contemporary religious art--thus ensuring, thanks to the absence of strong practitioners, that it remains at the level of kitsch. And the art world itself has suffered: with deeper themes excised, it slid into a shallow, jokey postmodernism that reduced art to ideology and treated art works as vehicles of approved social messages."[59]

 

Discussion about religion has largely devolved into a political debate: "The Sixties were the breeding ground for the depressingly formulaic political and cultural pattern of the last thirty-five years--a rigid polarization of liberals and conservatives, with each group striking predictable postures and mouthing sanctimonious platitudes. Gradations of political thought have been lost."[60] The result:

 

  • "There is vicious mutual recrimination, with believers caricatured as paranoid, apocalyptic crusaders who view America's global mission as divinely inspired, while liberals are portrayed as narcissistic hedonists and godless elitists, relics of the unpatriotic, permissive 1960s."[61] 

  • "Conservative Christians deplore the left-wing bias of the mainstream media and the saturation of popular culture by sex and violence and are promoting strategies such as faith-based home-schooling to protect children from the chaotic moral relativism of a secular society."[62] But social fragmentation is already tearing apart western culture; religious self-isolation and withdrawal from community just adds to the problem.

  • "Liberals in turn condemn the meddling by Christian fundamentalists in politics, notably in regard to abortion and gay civil rights or the Mideast, where biblical assumptions, it is claimed, have shaped U.S. policy."[63] Liberals "equate believers with the glum morality police or dismiss them as a naïve, unwashed hoi polloi in fly-over country."[64] But liberal zealotry brings its own problems: "[P]rogressive politics has too often become a sterile instrument of government manipulation, as if social-welfare agencies and federal programs could bring salvation."[65]

 

By way of a remedy, Paglia again argues in favor of a multidisciplinary, multicultural approach: "Let me make my premises clear: I am a professed atheist and a pro-choice libertarian Democrat. But [...] I have been calling for nearly two decades for massive educational reform that would put the study of comparative religion at the center of the university curriculum."[66]

 

Paglia argues that "true multiculturalism would make scholarly study of comparative religion the core curriculum of university humanities programs everywhere. No society or civilization can be understood without reference to its religious roots. Every student should graduate with a basic familiarity with the history, sacred texts, codes, rituals, and shrines of the major world religions--Hinduism, Buddhism, Judeo-Christianity, and Islam."[67]

 

Paglia says, "To fully appreciate world art, one must learn how to respond to religious expression in all its forms. Art began as religion in prehistory. It does not require belief to be moved by a sacred shrine, icon, or scripture. Hence art lovers, even when as citizens they stoutly defend democratic institutions against religious intrusion, should always speak with respect of religion." She continues:

  • "Conservatives [...] need to expand their parched and narrow view of culture. Every vibrant civilization welcomes and nurtures the arts. [...] If conservatives are serious about educational standards, they must support the teaching of art history in primary school--which means conservatives have to get over their phobia about the nude, which has been a symbol of Western art and Western individualism and freedom since the Greeks invented democracy."

  • "Progressives must start recognizing the spiritual poverty of contemporary secular humanism and reexamine the way that liberalism too often now automatically defines human aspiration and human happiness in reductively economic terms."

  • Paglia concludes, "Without compromise, we are heading for a soulless future. But when set against the vast historical panorama, religion and art--whether in marriage or divorce--can reinvigorate American culture."[68]

 

Paglia says, "By juxtaposing multiple belief systems, comparative religion is the true multiculturalism, demonstrating the range and complexity of human societies through history."[69] Obviously, this isn't about forcing beliefs on anyone. Rather, a grounding in world religions helps the student define his own values and find his own place in the world. In this manner comparative religion studies can serve as a "recollectivization" or renewed connection with the community and a way to learn about social narratives and boundaries via a comparative study of the social impact of different religious canons. As Paglia says, "Teaching religion as culture rather than as morality also gives students the intellectual freedom to find the ethical principles at the heart of every religion."[70]

 

Mainstream culture as a tool for engagement

I would suggest that we can also look at mainstream culture in terms of how it engages (or fails to engage) the individual. Decadence is associated with both extreme one-sidedness and anomie: At the start of this supplemental essay I suggested that modern freedoms make it easy for people to either run to extremes (decadent victimhood or rebellion) or to give up and collapse into an attitude of non-participation (decadent disengagement). As I said above, the five-position spectrum for decadence is:

 

Decadent victimhood <- Conventional one-sided extraversion -> Decadent disengagement <- Conventional one-sided introversion -> Decadent rebellion

 

If society wishes to steer people away from decadence, then conventional extraversion and conventional introversion represent the healthy, non-decadent attitudes. They tend to embody common, socially-approved narratives; as such, they represent an investment in society, hence a "recollectivization" and an antidote to alienation of the individual and fragmentation of the community.

 

Conventional extraversion and conventional introversion each represent one side of a dichotomous pair, so they end up being in opposition. That state of opposition provides them with agenda and agency. (The same holds true for the two sides of any other dichotomous pair: conventional femininity versus conventional masculinity, conventional sexuality versus conventional spirituality, conventional collectivism versus conventional individualism, and so on.) Opposition of two sides of a dichotomous pair creates agenda and energy because one side is typically conscious and one side is unconscious. 

 

In his book On the Psychology of the Unconscious psychologist Carl Jung says that the unconscious or "shadow" portion of a dichotomy is a necessary part of the whole: "[T]here is no energy unless there is a tension of opposites; hence it is necessary to discover the opposite to the attitude of the conscious mind. […] Seen from the one-sided point of view of the conscious attitude, the shadow is an inferior component of the personality and is consequently repressed through intensive resistance. But the repressed content must be made conscious so as to produce a tension of opposites, without which no forward movement is possible. The conscious mind is on top, the shadow underneath, and just as high always longs for low and hot for cold, so all consciousness, perhaps without being aware of it, seeks its unconscious opposite, lacking which it is doomed to stagnation, congestion, and ossification. Life is born only of the spark of opposites."[71]

 

As I said in the Sensing chapter: When interacting and in the process of centroversion, the two opposite sides of a conventional dichotomous pair remain separate and maintain a degree of tension between themselves but also share energy. Camille Paglia says, "Identity thrives by conflict and opposition."[72] Centroversion is earned by meeting challenges, resolving tension and strife, and gaining new problem-solving skills. This represents a healthy preservation of personal agency and agenda while granting the other party the same in return.

 

So it is important to preserve and encourage competing agendas rather than endorsing one and shouldering out the other in a zero-sum approach. A balanced approach in this manner on the part of society and government would restore the "anchor" of healthy one-sidedness as an alternative to expansion into harmful extremes (decadent rebellion or victimhood) or collapse into anomie (decadent disengagement).

 

The internet

The internet could represent an example of a new technology with the power to engage the individual and lower the prevalence of harmful alienation and decadence in society. The internet represents a force for recollectivization. It provides immediacy, information, and practical resources. People can gather on social media and develop a quick consensus of sorts on breaking issues. It offers participation for dropouts and provides tools to boost the agency of rebels and victims.

 

Of course, it has its negatives. Much like the hippies of the 1960s, people can float around and get siloed into small, esoteric communities. And time spent on-line may come at the expense of socialization in real life. But the internet offers a vast range of possibilities. Healthy alternatives, large media platforms for general discussion of current events, and meet-up groups for socializing in real life exist on-line for those who want them.

 

The internet also provides a measure of immunity to social engineering by the government. As I described above, prior to the internet government could use its legal, fiscal, and funding powers to draw in media and corporations as gatekeepers and effectively freeze out voices that went against the mainstream narrative. But the scope of the internet allows for the creation of alternate channels even when government controls mainstream on-line social media sites. Podcasters and influencers have become alternative sources of information. 

 

The power of the internet became apparent after the 2024 elections. Coming off the COVID-19 mandates of 2021, which were used to justify centralized supervision of information disseminated over the mainstream media, the Biden administration had a fairly high degree of control over much of official media, academia, and the corporate world. In 2024 candidate Trump used alternative social media and podcasters and influencers to outflank candidate Harris; many analysts have said that Trump's use of the internet in this manner was a significant factor in his victory.

 

In much the same fashion, people alienated by mainstream ideology and content can always find routes around official channels on the internet, even if only to commune with other disaffected groups. Alternative media becomes a channel for recollectivization of the disaffected. And if enough people bail out of official media channels and participate in alternative media on the internet, it becomes a warning sign that perhaps society isn't addressing the concerns of a growing cohort of citizens.

 

One major negative of the internet (and of alternative media in particular) is the existence of frauds (conspiracy theorists, demagogues, grifters, and so on) and those who enable them. Up until recently the gatekeepers of social media handled frauds by banning them from large social media platforms and then simply ignoring them, with the aim of starving them of attention. 

 

But the frauds just move to alternative media and, unopposed there, rack up millions of followers over time. Eventually some of the larger podcasters and influencers notice the size of the audience of such frauds and begin to "enable" them: They host the toxic frauds in order to boost their own viewership by providing controversial fare, and they give the frauds a warm reception in order to curry favor with their large following, using the justification that they are "just asking a few questions" of a controversial figure. In this manner conspiracy theorists and demagogues are provided a back door to legitimacy and national exposure by wielding their large audiences strategically.

 

By way of a remedy, I would argue that mainstream media sites should engage toxic ideas and internet frauds earlier, when they first appear, rather than excluding them, ignoring them, and letting them gain large audiences on alternative channels. The internet effectively makes it impossible to gate-keep or cancel; as a result, mainstream media should engage frauds early and debate them in the open with the aim of confronting toxicity with truth. In other words, it's about presenting the public with a spectrum of ideas and letting a consensus develop. If done right, good ideas should crowd out bad ideas. Toxic influencers and their enablers will always be out there, but if they are called out on their bad ideas on a regular basis, it should shine a light on their rip-offs and cost them some audience, and perhaps at a minimum they can be convinced to discard some of the worst of their toxicity. 

 

People should be allowed to say pretty much anything they want. But they should also be called out and identified for who and what they are: They are either truth-tellers, or they are frauds and enablers: Conspiracy theorists, demagogues, grifters, and so on. And then let the public decide for themselves.

 

To sum up: The power of the internet to affect society is still a rather new idea. The Harris campaign was caught unaware by the power of the internet to sway election results as late as November 2024. Society is still learning how to engage with the internet and maximize the positives while minimizing the negatives.

 

Basically the internet signals the end of gatekeepers and simplistic social engineering via mass communication. But that should be a healthy development: As I said above, healthy one-sidedness is promoted by encouraging tension and competition between competing agendas rather than endorsing one agenda and shouldering out others in a zero-sum approach. The availability of multiple competing narratives has the potential to result in less alienation. Of course, the existence of multiple competing narratives requires more work in the form of debate and confrontation, but that's good: Toxic elements can be identified and called out, and competition between otherwise healthy narratives will ideally compel audiences to notice, get engaged, and take a position, leading to healthy one-sidedness and organic development of compromise and consensus.

 

The role of government

What then becomes the role of government when it loses control of the power to set social narratives? Naturally some functions and issues should be handled expeditiously by experts at the level of national government, such as foreign policy, monetary policy, etc. But domestic social policy typically has a direct impact on the daily lives of the citizenry, and it's probably for the good that government loses some power there. Mass communications are a powerful tool, and when government intercedes in social policy it risks disenfranchising everyone who disagrees with the outcome.

 

The internet now allows competing narratives--some good, some bad--to flourish alongside a given mainstream narrative, and the government (and its media and corporate gatekeepers) should facilitate that process rather than fighting it and trying to favor one narrative while ignoring and excluding others. Furthermore, if one takes a dichotomous view of life, then much of the time there is no one right narrative. Social policy issues are more about compromise, which means recognizing the legitimacy of competing narratives. When government allows narratives to compete on a level playing field, it encourages people to practice healthy conventional one-sidedness, to debate, and to participate in the development of the nation's values.

 

This, in turn, becomes a means of combatting modern alienation, decadence, and nihilism. Despite all its faults, most analysts acknowledge that the internet has the power to engage people. If the government can facilitate healthy conventional one-sidedness and debate rather than practice social engineering, then the result should be a healthy, participatory democracy with a range of narratives and voices coexisting and seeking compromise and consensus.

 

Link: Return to Thinking (T)

 

~Posted December 29, 2025

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References

 

[1] Jacques Barzun, The Culture We Deserve (Wesleyan University Press, 1989), p. 175.

[2] Ibid., p. 31.

[3] Ibid., p. 32.

[4] Camille Paglia, Sexual Personae: Art and Decadence From Nefertiti to Emily Dickinson (First Vintage Books Edition, 1991), p. 490.

[5] Jacques Barzun, The Culture We Deserve (Wesleyan University Press, 1989), pp. 172-173.

[6] Jacques Barzun, From Dawn to Decadence: 500 Years of Western Cultural Life (Harper Perennial 2000, 2001), pp. xx-xxi.

[7] Jacques Barzun, The Culture We Deserve (Wesleyan University Press, 1989), pp. 167-168.

[8] Ibid., p. 163.

[9] Ibid., p. 173.

[10] Ibid., p. 167.

[11] Ibid., p. 174.

[12] Ibid., pp. 174-175.

[13] Ibid., p. 180.

[14] Camille Paglia, Sexual Personae: Art and Decadence From Nefertiti to Emily Dickinson (First Vintage Books Edition, 1991), p. 489.

[15] Ibid., p. 441.

[16] Ibid., p. 390.

[17] Ibid., p. 231.

[18] Ibid., p. 257.

[19] Camille Paglia, Provocations: Collected Essays (Vintage Books, 2018), pp. 93-98.

[20] Camille Paglia, Sexual Personae: Art and Decadence From Nefertiti to Emily Dickinson (First Vintage Books Edition, 1991), p. 501.

[21] Ibid., p. 496.

[22] Ibid., pp. 187-188.

[23] Ibid., p. 490.

[24] Ibid., p. 410.

[25] Ibid., p. 535.

[26] Ibid., p. 537.

[27] Ibid., p. 516.

[28] Ibid., p. 515.

[29] Ibid., p. 521.

[30] Ibid., pp. 543-545.

[31] Ibid., p. 554.

[32] Ibid., p. 557.

[33] Ibid., p. 430.

[34] Ibid., p. 389.

[35] Jacques Barzun, The Culture We Deserve (Wesleyan University Press, 1989), p. 163.

[36] Ibid., p. 179.

[37] Ibid., pp. 179-183.

[38] Camille Paglia, Sex, Art, and American Culture: Essays (Vintage Books, 1992), pp. 212-216.

[39] Ibid., p. 216.

[40] Camille Paglia, Provocations: Collected Essays (Vintage Books, 2018), p. 627.

[41] Ibid., pp. 645-646.

[42] Jacques Barzun, From Dawn to Decadence: 500 Years of Western Cultural Life (Harper Perennial 2000, 2001), p. 218.

[43] Camille Paglia, Provocations: Collected Essays (Vintage Books, 2018), p. 531.

[44] Jacques Barzun, The Culture We Deserve (Wesleyan University Press, 1989), pp. 182-183.

[45] Camille Paglia, Provocations: Collected Essays (Vintage Books, 2018), p. 406.

[46] Ibid., p. 375.

[47] Ibid., pp. 375-376.

[48] Ibid., p. 376.

[49] Ibid., p. 348.

[50] Ibid., p. 350.

[51] Ibid., p. 414.

[52] Ibid., p. 381.

[53] Ibid., p. 385.

[54] Ibid., p. 349.

[55] Ibid., pp. 350-351.

[56] Ibid., p. 550.

[57] Ibid., p. 571.

[58] Ibid., p. 550.

[59] Ibid., p. 510.

[60] Ibid., p. 508.

[61] Ibid., p. 549.

[62] Ibid.

[63] Ibid.

[64] Ibid., p. 571.

[65] Ibid., p. 508.

[66] Ibid., p. 550.

[67] Ibid., p. 567.

[68] Ibid., p. 566.

[69] Ibid., p. 573.

[70] Ibid., p. 548.

[71] C.G. Jung, Two Essays on Analytical Psychology (The Collected Works of C.G. Jung, Vol. 7), trans. R.F.C. Hull, with a forward by C.G. Jung, Bollingen Series XX (Bollingen Foundation Inc., 1953), pp. 53-54, par. 78.

[72] Camille Paglia, Sex, Art, and American Culture: Essays (Vintage Books, 1992), p. 41.

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